A Critical Study of Killer Acquisitions in the Digital Economy: Evaluating India

Abstract

The proliferation of digital markets has given rise to a novel and increasingly consequential phenomenon in competition law: killer acquisitions. These are transactions wherein dominant digital platforms wielding significant market power acquire nascent or potential competitors, not to integrate or develop their innovations, but specifically to eliminate the competitive threat they pose. The consequent stifling of innovation and entrenching of monopolistic power has exposed profound lacunae in traditional merger control frameworks premised upon turnover-based thresholds, particularly in jurisdictions such as India where the Competition Act, 2002 governs merger review.
This paper critically examines how India's merger control regime, as reformed by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, addresses or fails to adequately address the threat posed by killer acquisitions in the digital economy. The central research question is: Does the reformed Indian merger control framework sufficiently capture and scrutinise killer acquisitions by digital platforms, and if not, what regulatory interventions are warranted? The paper adopts a doctrinal-comparative methodology, analysing statutory provisions, Competition Commission of India (CCI) decisions, and judicial pronouncements alongside the EU and US regulatory frameworks. Secondary empirical literature on the frequency and effects of killer acquisitions in the technology sector is also engaged.
The paper argues that while the 2023 Amendment's introduction of a deal value threshold (DVT) is a significant and progressive step, structural and interpretive deficiencies continue to render the regime inadequate. Key arguments include the DVT's interpretive ambiguity, the under-utilisation of the Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) standard for dynamic markets, insufficient evidentiary standards for prospective harm, and the CCI's institutional capacity constraints in data-intensive digital investigations. The findings underscore the necessity of adopting forward-looking, effects-based analysis, supplementing the DVT with sector-specific presumptions, and empowering the CCI with ex ante regulatory tools analogous to the EU's Digital Markets Act. This paper contributes to the under-explored intersection of digital competition policy and merger control in Indian law.

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