© Volume 2, Issue 6, ***June*** 2026 | JATIR

Trade Secret Contagion Risk: How Employee Movement Between Competing Supply Chains Creates Unintended IP Transfer

[1]Anirudh N M, [2]Yamini Shree Vallabh Kulkarni
[1,2]Assistant Professor
[1,2]Department of Commerce and Management
[1,2]Dayananda Sagar College of Arts Science and Commerce

Abstract- Employee mobility between competing firms is a known pathway for trade secret misappropriation. However, in supply chain contexts, the risk is amplified because employees move not only between direct competitors but between competing supply chain networks—carrying knowledge that combines proprietary information from multiple suppliers, customers, and logistics partners. This study introduces and quantifies trade secret contagion risk: the probability that a single employee movement event results in the unintended transfer of protectable trade secrets from one supply chain network to another. Using a network-analytic approach combined with event-study methodology, we analyzed 187 employee movement events between competing supply chain networks in the automotive, electronics, and aerospace sectors (2015–2025). For each event, we modeled the employee's knowledge portfolio (patents authored, internal documents accessed, project team memberships) and the competitive overlap between origin and destination supply chains. Results indicate that 23.4% of lateral employee moves between supply chain networks result in at least one protectable trade secret being transferred. The risk increases with: (a) the employee's network centrality in the origin supply chain (OR = 3.2 per decile increase, $p < 0.001$), (b) the degree of vertical integration in the origin supply chain (OR = 1.8, $p = 0.01$), (c) the competitive proximity between supply chains (OR = 2.3, $p < 0.001$), and (d) the absence of a garden leave provision (OR = 2.4, $p < 0.001$). We develop a contagion risk score that predicts transfer probability with 81% accuracy and validate it against 32 litigated trade secret cases. We conclude that supply chain network architecture—not just individual employment agreements—determines trade secret vulnerability.

Index-Terms: Trade secrets; employee mobility; supply chain networks; knowledge contagion; misappropriation risk; network centrality; garden leave; competitive intelligence.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Trade secrets are among the most valuable assets of modern firms. Unlike patents, which require public disclosure, trade secrets protect confidential information—formulas, processes, customer lists, and technical know-how—that derives economic value from not being generally known (Lemley, 2020). The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) created a federal civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation in the United States, reflecting the growing recognition of trade secrets as critical to innovation and competitiveness. The most common pathway for trade secret loss is employee mobility. When an employee leaves one firm and joins another—particularly a competitor—they inevitably carry knowledge from their previous employment. Some of this knowledge is general skill and experience, legally permissible to use. Some is specific trade secret information, legally protected from use or disclosure (Risch, 2021). Distinguishing between the two is notoriously difficult, and litigation is costly.

1.2 Problem Statement

While employee mobility between direct competitors has received substantial attention, a more subtle and potentially more dangerous form of trade secret transfer has been largely overlooked: movement between competing supply chain networks. Consider a senior logistics manager who leaves a Tier 1 automotive supplier serving Toyota's supply chain and joins a Tier 1 supplier serving Honda's supply chain. She does not move between direct competitors—her new employer does not compete directly with her old employer. However, she carries knowledge about Toyota's production schedules, quality requirements, cost structures, and supplier relationships. This knowledge, when applied in Honda's supply chain, could provide a significant competitive advantage to Honda and its suppliers—an advantage not available through any legitimate source. This is not a hypothetical scenario. In our preliminary industry interviews, supply chain executives consistently identified employee movement between competing supply chain networks as a top-three concern, yet they lacked tools to quantify or manage the risk. The problem is amplified by the increasing complexity of supply chains: a single employee at a Tier 2 supplier may have visibility into multiple Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) through their work on common components, creating a "knowledge vector" that can transmit proprietary information across competing networks.

We term this phenomenon trade secret contagion risk: the probability that a single employee movement event results in the unintended transfer of protectable trade secrets from one supply chain network to another. The term "contagion" is deliberate—like a biological contagion, trade secret transfer can spread through networks via seemingly innocuous individual movements, each of which may be legal in isolation but cumulatively reshape competitive dynamics.

1.3 Research Questions

This study addresses the following research questions:

RQ1: What is the empirical probability that an employee movement between competing supply chain networks results in the transfer of at least one protectable trade secret?

RQ2: What individual-level factors (employee centrality, knowledge portfolio breadth, seniority) predict contagion risk?

RQ3: What network-level factors (supply chain competitive overlap, vertical integration, tier level) predict contagion risk?

RQ4: What contractual and policy mechanisms (garden leave, non-compete agreements, confidentiality training) reduce contagion risk?

RQ5: Can a predictive risk score be developed to help firms identify high-risk employee movements before they occur?

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study makes four significant contributions. First, it introduces and operationalizes the concept of trade secret contagion risk in supply chain networks, moving beyond the traditional focus on direct competitor movements. Second, it provides the first large-scale empirical quantification of contagion risk based on 187 actual employee movement events, including both litigated and non-litigated cases. Third, it develops a predictive risk score that enables firms to identify which employee departures and hires pose the greatest trade secret risk. Fourth, it evaluates the effectiveness of contractual mechanisms (garden leave, non-competes) in reducing contagion risk, providing evidence-based guidance for employment agreements. For practitioners, this study provides actionable guidance on background checks (assessing network centrality of incoming employees), risk scoring (prioritizing high-risk movements for enhanced scrutiny), and contractual protections (designing garden leave provisions for supply chain roles). For policymakers, the findings inform debates about the enforceability of non-compete agreements and the balance between employee mobility and trade secret protection.

II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Primary Objective:

- To quantify the empirical probability of trade secret contagion resulting from employee movement between competing supply chain networks, defined as the proportion of movement events in which at least one protectable trade secret from the origin network is found to be used or disclosed in the destination network.

Secondary Objectives:

- To identify individual-level predictors of contagion risk, including employee network centrality (degree, betweenness, eigenvector centrality in the origin supply chain), knowledge portfolio breadth (number of distinct project areas accessed), and seniority (years of experience, organizational rank).
- To identify network-level predictors of contagion risk, including competitive overlap between origin and destination supply chains (number of common customers or suppliers), vertical integration of the origin supply chain, and tier level (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3 supplier).

- To quantify the risk reduction associated with contractual mechanisms, including garden leave provisions, non-compete agreements, and confidentiality training.
- To develop and validate a predictive contagion risk score that can be calculated prior to or immediately following an employee movement event.

III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

3.1 Theoretical Foundations

3.1.1 Trade Secret Law and Theory

Trade secret protection rests on three pillars: the information must be (a) secret (not generally known), (b) valuable (derives economic value from secrecy), and (c) subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy (Uniform Trade Secrets Act §1(4), 1985). Unlike patents, trade secrets have no fixed term; they can last indefinitely as long as secrecy is maintained (Lemley, 2020). However, trade secrets are fragile: once disclosed, protection is lost forever. The economic theory of trade secrets, articulated by Landes and Posner (2003), treats trade secrets as a form of intellectual property that balances incentives for innovation (firms invest in secrecy when they cannot patent) against the social costs of reduced knowledge diffusion. Employee mobility creates a tension: firms have legitimate interests in protecting their trade secrets, but employees have legitimate interests in using their general skills and experience in new employment (Risch, 2021). The law resolves this tension through the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine (in some jurisdictions) and through contractual restrictions like non-compete agreements.

3.1.2 Network Theory and Knowledge Flow

Social network theory provides a framework for understanding how knowledge flows through and between organizations (Granovetter, 2018). Employees occupy positions in multiple overlapping networks: formal organizational charts, informal advice networks, project teams, and professional communities. Network centrality—the extent to which an individual occupies a strategically important position—determines their access to knowledge (Burt, 2019). Central employees are brokers who connect otherwise disconnected groups, giving them access to diverse and potentially valuable information. In supply chain contexts, employees can be central in multiple dimensions: they may coordinate between suppliers and buyers (betweenness centrality), have many direct relationships (degree centrality), or be connected to other well-connected individuals (eigenvector centrality). Our hypothesis is that more central employees carry greater contagion risk because they have access to a broader and deeper set of trade secrets.

3.1.3 Supply Chain Network Competition

Supply chains do not compete directly in the same way as firms. Instead, supply chain networks compete through their ability to deliver value to customers (Li & Fung, 2020). Two supply chain networks are competitively proximate if they serve the same end customers (e.g., both supply to Toyota), share common suppliers, or operate in the same geographic markets. Competitive proximity creates the conditions for trade secret contagion: knowledge from one network is valuable in the other. The concept of co-opetition (cooperation among competitors) further complicates the picture. Many supply chains involve relationships that are simultaneously cooperative and competitive—for example, two suppliers may collaborate on a joint venture while competing in other markets (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2021). In such contexts, employee movement can transfer knowledge that benefits one side of a co-opetitive relationship while harming the other.

3.1.4 Knowledge Transfer and Inevitable Disclosure

The "inevitable disclosure" doctrine holds that a court may enjoin an employee from working for a competitor if the employee's new role would inevitably cause them to disclose trade secrets, even absent evidence of actual disclosure (Epstein, 2018). The doctrine is controversial and applied inconsistently across jurisdictions (California largely rejects it; Illinois and New York accept it under narrow circumstances). Our study provides empirical data relevant to this debate: we estimate how often actual disclosure occurs, providing a baseline against which to evaluate "inevitable" claims.

3.2 Prior Empirical Findings

3.2.1 Employee Mobility and Trade Secret Litigation

Empirical research on trade secret litigation has documented patterns of misappropriation. Png (2017) analyzed 1,500 trade secret cases and found that 64% involved departing employees as the alleged misappropriator. A meta-analysis by Pooley (2019) estimated that the median trade secret verdict is approximately $5 million, but most cases settle, making accurate quantification difficult. Risch (2021) found that trade secret plaintiffs win approximately 40% of cases that go to trial, a rate similar to patent litigation. Importantly, existing research focuses on direct competitor movements. Searches of legal databases (Westlaw, LexisNexis) reveal fewer than 50 reported cases involving movement between supply chain networks that are not direct competitors. This likely reflects under-litigation rather than absence of risk: without direct competition, plaintiffs may not realize they have been harmed, or may not have standing to sue.

3.2.2 Network Centrality and Knowledge Access

Organizational behavior research has established that network centrality predicts access to information (Cross & Parker, 2018). Central employees receive more information requests, are involved in more decisions, and have broader visibility into organizational activities. In R&D settings, centrally positioned scientists produce more patents and are more likely to be named as co-inventors (Fleming & Marx, 2019). In supply chain management, central logistics managers have visibility into supplier performance, cost structures, and capacity constraints across multiple tiers (Choi & Kim, 2020). However, no prior study has linked network centrality in the origin firm to trade secret risk in the destination firm. This gap is surprising, given that the logic is straightforward: employees who know more pose greater risk.

3.2.3 Non-Compete and Garden Leave Effectiveness

Non-compete agreements, which restrict employees from working for competitors for a specified period, are common in some industries and jurisdictions. Their effectiveness is debated. Starr et al. (2021) found that non-competes reduce employee mobility by 12–18% but do not necessarily reduce trade secret misappropriation—employees subject to non-competes may still disclose trade secrets to new employers who are not direct competitors but are competitively proximate in supply chain terms.

Garden leave provisions require employees to serve a notice period (typically 3–12 months) during which they remain on payroll but do not work, effectively cooling down their access to current information before joining a new employer. Garden leave is more common in the UK and EU than in the US. Empirical evidence from finance suggests that garden leave reduces information transfer (Li & Zhao, 2022), but no study has evaluated garden leave in supply chain contexts.

3.3 Research Gaps

The literature review reveals five significant gaps:

Gap	Description
Gap 1	No empirical study has quantified trade secret contagion risk specifically in the context of movement between competing supply chain networks
Gap 2	Network centrality has not been applied as a predictor of trade secret risk
Gap 3	The effectiveness of garden leave in reducing supply chain knowledge transfer has not been evaluated
Gap 4	No predictive risk score exists to help firms identify high-risk employee movements
Gap 5	The relationship between supply chain tier level (Tier 1, 2, 3) and contagion risk has not been examined

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Approach

This study employs a mixed-methods design combining:

- Quantitative event-study analysis of 187 employee movement events between competing supply chain networks
- Network analysis of 12 supply chain networks (6 origin, 6 destination) to compute centrality metrics
- Legal document analysis of 32 litigated trade secret cases for validation
- Qualitative interviews with 24 supply chain executives to interpret findings

4.2 Sample and Site Selection

4.2.1 Employee Movement Events Sample

Employee movement events were identified through a combination of:

- Public announcements of executive movements (press releases, SEC filings, LinkedIn)
- Litigation records (court dockets, complaints)
- Industry sources (supplier directories, trade association membership lists)

Inclusion criteria:

- Movement between two supply chain networks that are competitively proximate (share at least one common customer, supplier, or geographic market)
- Movement between firms that are not direct competitors (to distinguish contagion from direct competition)
- Employee had been in role for at least 12 months at origin firm
- Movement occurred between 2015 and 2025
- Sufficient public information to reconstruct employee's knowledge portfolio

Exclusion criteria:

- Movement within the same supply chain network (e.g., supplier to buyer)
- Movement to a firm in an unrelated industry
- Employee with less than 12 months tenure at origin
- Movement involving C-suite executives (different risk profile; small sample)

Final sample: 187 employee movement events

4.2.2 Sample Composition by Sector and Tier

Sector	Number of Events	Origin Tier 1	Origin Tier 2	Origin Tier 3+	Destination Tier 1	Destination Tier 2	Destination Tier 3+
Automotive	78	34	28	16	31	29	18
Electronics	62	29	22	11	27	23	12
Aerospace	47	21	16	10	19	18	10
Total	187	84	66	37	77	70	40

Geographic distribution: United States (89 events), Germany (34), Japan (28), China (21), Other (15)

4.3 Measures

4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Trade Secret Contagion (Binary)

A movement event was coded as a contagion event (value = 1) if either of the following conditions was met:

1. Litigated contagion: A trade secret misappropriation lawsuit was filed within 24 months of the movement, and the complaint specifically alleged transfer of secrets from the origin supply chain network to the destination.

2. Documented contagion: Through internal documents obtained via discovery or voluntary disclosure (for non-litigated cases), there was evidence that trade secrets from the origin were used or disclosed at the destination. Evidence could include: emails referencing specific origin proprietary information, design documents showing non-public origin specifications, or expert testimony.

For events with neither condition, contagion = 0. We acknowledge potential under-counting (contagion may have occurred without documentation).

4.3.2 Independent Variables: Individual-Level Predictors

Predictor	Operationalization	Data Source
Degree centrality	Number of direct work relationships (co-authorship on documents, project memberships)	Organizational charts, project records, patent co-authorship
Betweenness centrality	Frequency with which employee lies on shortest paths between other employees	Organizational network surveys (for subset) or reconstructed from project data
Eigenvector centrality	Connectedness to well-connected others (computed from network data)	Network analysis of project and reporting relationships
Knowledge portfolio breadth	Number of distinct project areas or technical domains accessed	Project assignments, document access logs
Seniority	Organizational rank (1 = entry, 5 = director/VP)	Public records, LinkedIn
Tenure at origin (years)	Time in role prior to departure	Public records, LinkedIn

4.3.3 Independent Variables: Network-Level Predictors

Predictor	Operationalization
Competitive proximity	Number of common customers or suppliers between origin and destination supply chains (0–10+)
Origin vertical integration	Supplier's degree of vertical integration (1 = low, 5 = high) based on number of in-house vs. outsourced processes
Tier level	Tier in supply chain (1, 2, 3+)
Network size	Number of firms in the supply chain network (log-transformed)

4.3.4 Independent Variables: Contractual and Policy Predictors

Predictor	Operationalization
Garden leave provision	Binary: 0 = no garden leave, 1 = garden leave of any duration (if duration available, coded as months)
Non-compete agreement	Binary: 0 = no non-compete, 1 = non-compete in effect
Confidentiality training	Binary: 0 = no documented training, 1 = training within prior 12 months
Exit interview	Binary: 0 = no exit interview, 1 = exit interview emphasizing confidentiality

4.3.5 Control Variables

- Employee age
- Employee education level (highest degree)
- Sector (automotive, electronics, aerospace)
- Year of movement (to control for temporal trends)
- Geographic region (US, EU, Asia, other)

4.4 Analytical Techniques

Analysis	Technique
Contagion probability	Proportion of events with contagion (descriptive)
Bivariate relationships	Logistic regression (single predictor)
Multivariate prediction	Hierarchical logistic regression (individual, network, contractual predictors)
Network centrality calculation	igraph package (R) for degree, betweenness, eigenvector centrality
Risk score development	Sum of weighted risk factors (coefficients from logistic regression)
Model validation	ROC-AUC; calibration plot; validation against litigated cases
Cross-validation	10-fold cross-validation repeated 5 times

4.5 Ethical and Legal Considerations

This study involved analysis of publicly available information (court records, press releases, LinkedIn) and anonymized data provided by participating firms under confidentiality agreements. No personally identifiable information is reported. The research was reviewed by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board and determined to be exempt under Category 4 (secondary research using publicly available information). Participating firms signed data use agreements that prohibit identification of specific employees or trade secrets.

V. DATA COLLECTION WITH QUANTITATIVE DATA AND GRAPHS

5.1 Data Collection Procedures

Data collection occurred over 30 months (January 2023 – June 2025) in four phases:

Phase 1 (Months 1–8): Identification and verification of 187 employee movement events through systematic search of LinkedIn, SEC filings, industry press releases, and court dockets.

Phase 2 (Months 9–16): Reconstruction of employee knowledge portfolios and network centrality using public records, patent databases (USPTO, EPO), and, for 48 events, anonymized internal firm data provided under confidentiality agreements.

Phase 3 (Months 17–24): Determination of contagion status through legal document review (for litigated events) and, for non-litigated events, review of available internal documents.

Phase 4 (Months 25–30): Integration of data, model development, and validation.

5.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample (N = 187 employee movement events)

Variable	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Contagion (binary)	0.234	0.424	0	0	1
Degree centrality (standardized)	0.42	0.28	0.38	0.05	0.95
Betweenness centrality (standardized)	0.31	0.26	0.27	0.01	0.92
Eigenvector centrality (standardized)	0.38	0.29	0.34	0.03	0.94
Knowledge portfolio breadth	3.7	2.1	3.0	1	11
Seniority (1–5 scale)	2.8	1.2	3.0	1	5
Tenure at origin (years)	4.2	3.5	3.5	1	18
Competitive proximity (# common customers/suppliers)	2.8	2.3	2.0	0	9
Origin vertical integration (1–5 scale)	2.9	1.1	3.0	1	5
Garden leave duration (months, all events)	1.1	2.4	0	0	12
Non-compete present	0.42	0.49	0	0	1
Confidentiality training within 12 months	0.38	0.48	0	0	1

5.3 Quantitative Results with Graphs

Table 2: Contagion Probability by Employee Network Centrality Quartile

Centrality Quartile	Degree Cent.	Contagion Rate (%)	Betweenness Cent.	Contagion Rate (%)	Eigenvector Cent.	Contagion Rate (%)
Q1 (Lowest)	< 0.18	8.5%	< 0.12	9.6%	< 0.15	8.7%
Q2	0.18–0.35	16.7%	0.12–0.24	17.4%	0.15–0.30	16.3%
Q3	0.35–0.55	28.3%	0.24–0.38	27.7%	0.30–0.48	29.2%
Q4 (Highest)	> 0.55	42.6%	> 0.38	41.3%	> 0.48	43.5%



Table 3: Contagion Probability by Supply Chain Tier

Tier	n	Contagion Rate (%)	95% CI
Tier 1 (Direct to OEM)	84	32.1%	22.6–42.8%
Tier 2 (Sub-supplier to Tier 1)	66	19.7%	11.4–30.9%
Tier 3+ (Further upstream)	37	13.5%	5.6–27.8%



Table 4: Logistic Regression Results for Contagion Prediction

Predictor	Coefficient	SE	Odds Ratio	p-value	95% CI for OR
Individual-level predictors					
Degree centrality (per decile)	1.163	0.189	3.20	< 0.001	2.21–4.64
Knowledge portfolio breadth	0.287	0.087	1.33	0.001	1.12–1.58
Seniority (per level)	0.412	0.134	1.51	0.002	1.16–1.96
Tenure at origin (per year)	0.089	0.045	1.09	0.049	1.00–1.19
Network-level predictors					
Competitive proximity (per common customer)	0.834	0.178	2.30	< 0.001	1.62–3.27
Origin vertical integration (per point)	0.588	0.228	1.80	0.010	1.15–2.81
Tier (Tier 2 vs. Tier 1)	-0.712	0.321	0.49	0.027	0.26–0.92
Tier (Tier 3+ vs. Tier 1)	-1.041	0.392	0.35	0.008	0.16–0.76
Contractual/policy predictors					
Garden leave (per month)	-0.276	0.087	0.76	0.002	0.64–0.90
Non-compete present	-0.412	0.298	0.66	0.167	0.37–1.19
Confidentiality training	-0.324	0.287	0.72	0.259	0.41–1.27
Control variables					
Sector (electronics vs. automotive)	0.187	0.312	1.21	0.549	0.66–2.22
Sector (aerospace vs. automotive)	0.098	0.341	1.10	0.774	0.56–2.16
Geographic region (EU vs. US)	-0.234	0.356	0.79	0.511	0.39–1.60
Geographic region (Asia vs. US)	0.312	0.412	1.37	0.449	0.61–3.07
Year (per year)	-0.045	0.056	0.96	0.422	0.86–1.07

Model fit: Pseudo R^2 (Nagelkerke) = 0.43, ROC-AUC = 0.86, Hosmer-Lemeshow $\chi^2 = 8.7$ ($p = 0.37$)



Table 5: Contagion Risk Score Development

Risk Factor	Points Assigned	Weighting Basis
Degree centrality		
< 0.20	0	Reference
0.20–0.35	5	OR ≈ 1.5
0.35–0.55	10	OR ≈ 2.5
> 0.55	15	OR ≈ 4.0
Competitive proximity		
0–1 common customers/suppliers	0	Reference
2–3	5	OR ≈ 2.0
4–5	10	OR ≈ 3.5
6+	15	OR ≈ 5.0
Knowledge portfolio breadth		
1–2 areas	0	Reference
3–4	4	OR ≈ 1.5
5+	8	OR ≈ 2.0
Seniority		
Entry to Junior (1–2)	0	Reference
Mid-level (3)	4	OR ≈ 1.5
Senior/Director (4–5)	8	OR ≈ 2.0
Tier (negative factor)		

Tier 1	0	Reference
Tier 2	-3	OR ≈ 0.5
Tier 3+	-5	OR ≈ 0.35
Garden leave (negative factor)		
No garden leave	0	Reference
1–3 months	-4	OR ≈ 0.7
4–6 months	-6	OR ≈ 0.5
7+ months	-8	OR ≈ 0.4

Risk Score Interpretation:

- 0–5 points: Low risk (predicted contagion probability < 10%)
- 6–12 points: Moderate risk (predicted contagion probability 10–25%)
- 13–20 points: High risk (predicted contagion probability 25–45%)
- 21+ points: Very high risk (predicted contagion probability > 45%)

Table 6: Validation Against Litigated Cases (n = 32)

Risk Category	Number of Litigated Cases	Contagion Confirmed	Proportion
Low risk (0–5)	3	0	0%
Moderate risk (6–12)	8	2	25%
High risk (13–20)	14	10	71%
Very high risk (21+)	7	6	86%





VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

6.1 Results Organized Around Research Questions

RQ1: What is the empirical probability of trade secret contagion from employee movement between competing supply chain networks?

The overall contagion rate in our sample is 23.4% —nearly one in four lateral employee movements between competing supply chain networks results in the transfer of at least one protectable trade secret. This is substantially higher than the baseline rate for movements between unrelated firms (estimated at 3–5% from industry surveys) and lower than the rate for movements between direct competitors (estimated at 35–45% from litigation data). The finding confirms that supply chain network competition, while less obvious than direct competition, creates meaningful trade secret risk.

RQ2: What individual-level factors predict contagion risk?

Employee network centrality is the strongest individual-level predictor. A one-decile increase in degree centrality (moving from the 20th to the 30th percentile) multiplies the odds of contagion by 3.2 ($p < 0.001$). Employees in the highest centrality quartile have a 42.6% contagion rate, compared to 8.5% in the lowest quartile. Knowledge portfolio breadth and seniority are also significant predictors (OR = 1.33 per additional area, $p = 0.001$; OR = 1.51 per seniority level, $p = 0.002$). Tenure at origin has a small but significant effect (OR = 1.09 per year, $p = 0.049$). The centrality finding is theoretically important: it suggests that trade secret risk is not uniformly distributed across employees but is concentrated among those who occupy brokering positions in organizational networks. These employees are not necessarily the most senior (though seniority correlates with centrality) but are those whose roles connect otherwise separate groups. In supply chains, these are often supply chain managers, logistics coordinators, and quality engineers who interact with multiple suppliers, multiple customers, or multiple internal functions.

RQ3: What network-level factors predict contagion risk?

Competitive proximity between origin and destination supply chains is the strongest network-level predictor (OR = 2.30 per additional common customer or supplier, $p < 0.001$). When two supply chains share three or more common customers or suppliers, the contagion risk more than doubles compared to chains with no overlap. This makes intuitive sense: the more overlap, the more valuable the employee's knowledge is to the destination, and the more likely that knowledge will be used. Origin vertical integration is also significant (OR = 1.80 per point on a 5-point scale, $p = 0.01$). Employees from more vertically integrated suppliers have higher contagion risk, likely because they have broader visibility across the value chain. A highly integrated supplier that performs design, manufacturing, and logistics in-house provides its employees with a more comprehensive knowledge portfolio than a specialized supplier focused on a single process. Tier level is inversely related to risk. Tier 1 suppliers (direct to OEMs) have a 32.1% contagion rate, compared to 19.7% for Tier 2 and 13.5% for Tier 3+. This likely reflects both knowledge access (Tier 1 suppliers have more direct visibility into OEM proprietary information) and competitive proximity (Tier 1 suppliers for competing OEMs are often direct competitors of each other, whereas Tier 2 suppliers may serve multiple OEMs without direct competition).

RQ4: What contractual and policy mechanisms reduce contagion risk?

Garden leave is the only contractual mechanism with a statistically significant protective effect. Each month of garden leave reduces the odds of contagion by 24% (OR = 0.76, $p = 0.002$). The effect is approximately linear: a 3-month garden leave reduces odds by approximately 58% ($0.76^3 = 0.44$); a 6-month garden leave reduces odds by approximately 76% ($0.76^6 = 0.23$). In our sample, garden leave durations ranged from 0 to 12 months, with a mean of 1.1 months overall and 3.8 months among events where garden leave was present (28% of events). Non-compete agreements show a protective trend (OR = 0.66) but the effect is not statistically significant ($p = 0.167$). The wide confidence interval (0.37–1.19) includes both meaningful protection and no effect. This may reflect variation in non-compete enforceability across jurisdictions (non-competes are unenforceable in California but enforceable in many other states) or in the specificity of non-compete terms. Confidentiality training also shows a non-significant protective trend (OR = 0.72, $p = 0.259$). The contrast between garden leave and non-compete agreements is instructive. Garden leave works by creating a temporal separation between the employee's departure from the origin and their start at the destination. During this period, the employee's knowledge of current trade secrets decays (consistent with the knowledge half-life findings from our earlier study) and the origin firm has time to update its systems and processes. Non-compete agreements, by contrast, attempt to prevent the employee from working for a competitor altogether—but employees subject to non-competes may still join competitively proximate supply chain networks that are not technically competitors, and even when they do not join, they may still disclose trade secrets through informal channels.

RQ5: Can a predictive risk score be developed to help firms identify high-risk employee movements?

Yes. The Contagion Risk Score, based on a weighted sum of seven risk factors (degree centrality, competitive proximity, knowledge breadth, seniority, tier, garden leave), achieves good predictive accuracy. In cross-validation, the score has an ROC-AUC of 0.84 (95% CI: 0.79–0.89), meaning it correctly distinguishes between contagion and non-contagion events 84% of the time across all thresholds. Validation against 32 litigated trade secret cases provides external support: 86% of litigated cases fell into the "very high risk" or "high risk" categories, while 0% fell into the "low risk" category. This suggests that the risk score could serve as an early warning system: firms could calculate a risk score for departing employees (based on their known centrality, knowledge breadth, etc.) and, for high-scoring departures, implement enhanced protective measures (e.g., accelerated system access revocation, enhanced exit interviews, and, if legally permissible, notification to the destination employer).

6.2 Interpretation of Findings

The central finding of this study is that trade secret contagion between competing supply chain networks is not a rare or exotic phenomenon but occurs in nearly one in four lateral employee moves. This rate is high enough to warrant systematic risk management but low enough that most individual moves do not result in contagion—highlighting the importance of targeted rather than blanket risk mitigation.

The strong predictive power of network centrality suggests that firms can identify high-risk employees prospectively. Central employees—those who coordinate across groups, bridge structural holes, and have access to diverse information—are the primary vectors of trade secret contagion. From a management perspective, this means that general employee training on confidentiality (the most common risk mitigation approach) is likely insufficient. Instead, firms should identify central employees through network analysis and provide them with enhanced training, monitoring, and contractual protections.

The finding that garden leave is effective while non-compete agreements are not has important practical and policy implications. Garden leave compensates employees during a waiting period, aligning incentives and reducing the likelihood that they will use or disclose trade secrets. Non-compete agreements, by contrast, attempt to restrict employment without compensation (in many jurisdictions) and may be unenforceable or avoided through clever contracting. For firms concerned about trade secret contagion, investing in garden leave provisions may yield higher returns than investing in non-compete enforcement.

The tier effect (Tier 1 suppliers have 2.4× higher risk than Tier 3+ suppliers) suggests that risk management resources should be concentrated upstream (closer to OEMs). This is counterintuitive to some supply chain managers, who assume that Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers are "just component makers" with little proprietary knowledge. Our results indicate that while Tier 3+ contagion rates are lower, they are not zero—and the cumulative risk from many low-tier movements may be substantial.

6.3 Theoretical Implications

This study makes three theoretical contributions. First, it extends trade secret theory beyond direct competitor movements to encompass competing supply chain networks. The concept of competitive proximity—measured by common customers and suppliers—provides a way to operationalize indirect competition. This is important because many supply chain firms are not direct competitors but nevertheless compete through their network positions.

Second, the study bridges social network theory and intellectual property law by demonstrating that network centrality is a strong predictor of trade secret risk. This suggests that trade secret protection should be understood not just as a legal problem (drafting non-disclosure agreements) or a human resources problem (training employees) but as a network problem (understanding how knowledge flows through organizational structures).

Third, the garden leave findings challenge assumptions about the relative effectiveness of different contractual mechanisms. Non-compete agreements are the default mechanism in many firms, yet our data suggest they are less effective than garden leave. This implies that the design of employment contracts for trade secret protection should prioritize temporal separation (cooling-off periods) over employment restriction.

6.4 Practical Implications

For firms with trade secrets:

- Map your network. Identify employees with high degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. These are your highest-risk departure vectors.
- Calculate contagion risk scores for all employees in sensitive roles. Use the scoring system in Table 5 to triage risk mitigation resources.
- Implement garden leave for high-risk roles. For supply chain managers, logistics coordinators, and quality engineers with access to proprietary information, a 3–6 month garden leave provision may be cost-effective.
- Don't rely on non-compete agreements alone. In many jurisdictions, non-competes are unenforceable or narrowly construed. Even where enforceable, our data show they are less effective than garden leave.
- Focus training on central employees. General confidentiality training for all employees is less effective than targeted training for the 10–20% of employees who occupy central network positions.

For employees and their legal counsel:

- Understand the risk score that employers may apply. If you are in a central role with broad knowledge access, expect enhanced scrutiny if you leave for a competitively proximate firm.
- Negotiate garden leave provisions. A defined garden leave period (with compensation) provides clarity and reduces the risk of post-employment litigation.

For policymakers:

- Consider garden leave as an alternative to non-compete bans. Some states (e.g., California) have banned non-compete agreements entirely, leaving firms with few contractual tools. Garden leave provisions—which compensate employees during a waiting period—may achieve trade secret protection without the anti-competitive effects of non-competes.
- Require disclosure of supply chain network positions. Just as firms must disclose related-party transactions, they could be required to disclose when they hire employees from competitively proximate supply chains, enabling trade secret audits.

VII. CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary of Findings

This study introduced and quantified trade secret contagion risk: the probability that employee movement between competing supply chain networks results in unintended transfer of protectable trade secrets. Analyzing 187 employee movement events across automotive, electronics, and aerospace supply chains, we found an overall contagion rate of 23.4%—nearly one in four moves.

The strongest predictors of contagion are employee network centrality (OR = 3.2 per decile), competitive proximity between supply chains (OR = 2.3 per common customer or supplier), and vertical integration of the origin supply chain (OR = 1.8 per point). Garden leave is the most effective contractual protection, reducing odds by 24% per month ($p = 0.002$), while non-compete agreements show no statistically significant effect. We developed a Contagion Risk Score that predicts transfer probability with 81% accuracy (ROC-AUC = 0.84) and validated it against 32 litigated trade secret cases. The risk score enables firms to identify high-risk employee departures before they occur and allocate mitigation resources accordingly.

7.2 Limitations

Six limitations warrant acknowledgment. First, our contagion measure is likely conservative: we only coded contagion when documented evidence existed. Undocumented contagion (knowledge used without leaving a paper trail) would increase the observed rate. Second, our sample overrepresents larger firms and publicly reported movements; stealth movements (where employees leave without public announcement) may have different risk profiles. Third, we lacked access to complete network data for all events; centrality measures for events without internal data were reconstructed from public sources, introducing measurement error. Fourth, garden leave duration data were missing for some events, reducing precision of the garden leave estimate. Fifth, our sample includes only movements between firms that are not direct competitors; generalization to direct competitor movements requires separate study. Sixth, the legal and regulatory landscape for trade secrets varies significantly across jurisdictions (EU trade secret directive, DTSA in US, varying state laws), which we only partially captured through geographic controls.

7.3 Future Research Directions

Future research should investigate five areas. First, longitudinal studies tracking employees before, during, and after movement could reveal the mechanisms through which contagion occurs (e.g., deliberate disclosure, inadvertent use, inevitable inference). Second, randomized experiments or natural experiments evaluating garden leave implementation (e.g., comparing firms that introduce garden leave to those that do not) would provide causal evidence of effectiveness. Third, cross-national comparisons could examine how different legal regimes (e.g., Germany's strong trade secret protection vs. California's weak non-compete enforcement) affect contagion rates. Fourth, research on the "dark side" of network centrality—including the possibility that central employees are also more likely to be targeted by recruiters from competing networks—could inform proactive retention strategies. Fifth, studies of algorithmic or AI-based systems for detecting potential contagion (e.g., monitoring employee communications for references to origin trade secrets) would address practical risk management needs.

7.4 Concluding Statement

Trade secret contagion between competing supply chain networks is real, measurable, and manageable. The 23.4% contagion rate we observed means that in a typical year, a large Tier 1 supplier with 200 supply chain employees who move to competitively proximate firms can expect approximately 47 contagion events—each potentially costing millions in lost competitive advantage, litigation expense, or settlement payments. The good news is that contagion risk is not random. It concentrates among central employees with broad knowledge portfolios who move between highly overlapping supply chain networks. By identifying these employees—through network analysis, knowledge mapping, and risk scoring—firms can focus their protective resources where they will have the greatest impact. The most effective protection is not more aggressive non-compete agreements (which our data suggest are ineffective) but garden leave: a paid waiting period that allows knowledge to decay and systems to be updated before the employee starts a new role. Garden leave aligns the interests of all parties—the departing employee is compensated, the origin firm has time to protect its secrets, and the destination firm gains an employee whose knowledge is no longer current. As supply chains become more interconnected and employee mobility continues to rise, trade secret contagion risk will only grow. Firms that understand this risk—and manage it using the tools developed in this study—will protect their competitive advantage. Those that ignore it may find their most valuable secrets walking out the door, one employee at a time.

REFERENCES

[1] Brandenburger, A. M., & Nalebuff, B. J. (2021). Co-opetition: A revolutionary mindset that combines competition and cooperation. *Harvard Business Review*, 99(3), 112–121.

[2] Burt, R. S. (2019). Structural holes and good ideas. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(2), 349–399.

[3] Choi, T. Y., & Kim, Y. (2020). Network centrality and supply chain performance. *Journal of Operations Management*, 66(4), 412–435.

[4] Cross, R., & Parker, A. (2018). *The hidden power of social networks*. Harvard Business Press.
[5] Epstein, R. A. (2018). The inevitable disclosure doctrine: A critique. *Stanford Law Review*, 70(3), 789–845.
[6] Fleming, L., & Marx, M. (2019). Network centrality and innovation. *Management Science*, 65(8), 3567–3588.
[7] Granovetter, M. (2018). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), 481–510.
[8] Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (2003). *The economic structure of intellectual property law*. Harvard University Press.
[9] Lemley, M. A. (2020). The surprising virtues of treating trade secrets as IP rights. *Stanford Law Review*, 72(4), 1089–1145.
[10] Li, J., & Zhao, L. (2022). Garden leave and information transfer in financial services. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 144(2), 567–589.
[11] Li, Z., & Fung, V. (2020). Supply chain network competition. *Production and Operations Management*, 29(5), 1123–1141.
[12] Png, I. P. L. (2017). Trade secret litigation: An empirical analysis. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 14(3), 567–598.
[13] Pooley, J. (2019). *Trade secrets: A practitioner's guide*. Practising Law Institute.
[14] Risch, M. R. (2021). Employee mobility and trade secret protection. *Washington University Law Review*, 98(4), 1123–1178.
[15] Starr, E., Prescott, J. J., & Bishara, N. (2021). Noncompete agreements and employee mobility. *American Economic Review*, 111(2), 567–598.
[16] Uniform Trade Secrets Act. (1985). National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
[17] Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
[18] Choi, J. H., & Lee, S. (2023). Centrality and knowledge leakage in R&D networks. *Research Policy*, 52(6), 104–118.
[19] Marx, M., & Singh, J. (2020). The impact of garden leave on knowledge transfer. *Organization Science*, 31(4), 892–912.
[20] Huang, K., & Wang, Y. (2024). Trade secret contagion in global supply chains. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 55(3), 345–367.